On 20th April 2026, the High Court sitting in the Family Division delivered a decision that will likely become a defining reference point in Uganda’s evolving jurisprudence on burial disputes. In Mark Mutaaga Kabenge v Attorney General & 2 Others, Miscellaneous Cause No. 0035 of 2026, the Court was asked to determine a question that is at once deeply legal and profoundly human: who has the right to decide how and where a loved one is laid to rest?
The facts themselves reflect a reality that is increasingly common, yet insufficiently addressed in our legal framework. The deceased were Ugandan by origin, deeply rooted in Buganda culture, but also Swiss citizens who had spent a significant part of their lives abroad raising their children. Upon their death, their son, resident in Switzerland, sought to cremate their remains and repatriate them. The extended family and clan leadership insisted on burial at the ancestral home in Buddo in accordance with Kiganda custom. What followed was not just a dispute. It was a collision of identity, law, culture, and grief.
The Court approached the matter through the established legal position that there is no property in a dead body, but there is a duty to ensure its proper and dignified disposal. In the absence of a will or express instructions from the deceased, that responsibility falls to those most closely connected to the deceased. What is striking about this decision is how deliberately the Court moved away from a rigid application of hierarchy and instead anchored its reasoning in proximity. The Court acknowledged the traditional order of priority—spouse, children, parents, siblings—but made it clear that this is not a mechanical formula. It is the reality of lived relationships that must guide the outcome.
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a principle that is both obvious and often overlooked: the deceased were parents before they were anything else. The intimacy of the parent-child relationship, built through shared life, care, and daily presence, outweighed the claims of extended family, even where those claims were supported by customary authority. A cousin, even one clothed with cultural leadership, could not displace the authority of a child. A sibling, though close, could not outrank the position of children who had lived within the immediate orbit of the deceased’s life.
This emphasis on proximity is significant because it subtly redefines how we understand family authority in Uganda. For a long time, burial disputes have leaned heavily in favour of extended family structures and customary expectations. This case does not dismiss custom. Rather, it places it in context. Custom is recognised, respected, and applied, but it does not operate in isolation from the realities of modern family life. Where there is tension between customary roles and actual lived relationships, the Court is prepared to interrogate both and give precedence to the latter.
At the same time, the decision engages with a deeper philosophical tension around ancestry. The Court reiterated the position that we do not choose our ancestry; it is imposed by birth. That statement carries weight, particularly in a society where identity is closely tied to clan and lineage. Yet the case also exposes the limits of that principle. While ancestry may be fixed, life is not. People migrate. They build families across borders. They develop identities that are not confined to a single geography or cultural expectation. The law is now being asked to reconcile these dual realities—what we inherit and how we live.